After Norway, What’s Next? The Kingdom of Denmark and the Arctic Council’s Future

Back to Publications

Sermitsiaq (Saddle) Mountain forms a backdrop for Nuuk, capital of Greenland. Photo: David Stanley

On May 12, 2025, at the 14th ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council, Norway will officially conclude its Arctic Council Chairship, which it has held since 2023, and the Kingdom of Denmark will become the new chair. Established in 1996, the Arctic Council serves as the leading intergovernmental forum for promoting collaboration among Arctic states, Arctic Indigenous communities, and other actors. Its mandate covers sustainable development, environmental protection, support for Indigenous Peoples’ rights and interests, and scientific research cooperation. The Council operates by consensus of all the Arctic states and Permanent Participants. However, it lacks enforcement mechanisms and a fixed budget, making its recommendations non-binding. For many years, the Arctic Council has deliberately avoided security issues, which has allowed it to keep Arctic affairs separate from broader geopolitical tensions.

Norway’s approach has been to maintain the Council’s work in non-politically sensitive areas and without Russia’s participation. Although limited work through Working groups and Task forces has continued, most joint projects in the Arctic have been put on hold. The newly published Chairship program of the Kingdom of Denmark shows major changes compared to both Norway’s recent chairship and Denmark’s first chairship. The following sections will discuss the results of two years of Norway’s work and outline the key priorities of the Kingdom of Denmark’s approach to the upcoming chairship. Given the growing geopolitical tensions in the Arctic and continental Europe, an analysis of these two chairships provides a basis for understanding whether the Arctic Council can maintain its position as a relevant institution.

Norway’s Chairship

In May 2023, Norway took over the chairship of the Arctic Council from Russia. Despite the difficult period in which it assumed this role and the disruption of the Council’s high-level meetings, Norway managed to engage Permanent Participants and keep Working Groups efforts active through projects focused on wildfires and youth engagement.

Norway’s main goals upon assuming the chairship were to strengthen the resilience of the Arctic Council and promote cooperation between Arctic states and Indigenous Peoples. The Wildland Fires Initiative stands out in this regard, building on efforts launched during Finland’s chairship from 2017 to 2019, which focused on knowledge co-production and understanding of wildland fires in the Arctic. As part of this initiative, Norway supported broader Arctic discussions through events such as the Arctic Circle Assembly and Arctic Science Summit Week.

Norway also focused on getting more Arctic youth involved in the work of the Arctic Council, seeing them as important for the region’s sustainable future. Over the past two years, Norway organized events such as the Arctic Ocean Research Cruise II, the 2024 Youth Session for Permanent Participants, the Arctic Youth Conference, and the Chairship Youth Committee. However, for these efforts to have a long-term impact, future chairships, including Denmark, must continue these initiatives – otherwise, they will remain a formality.

Norway worked diligently to maintain the international relevance of the Arctic Council despite the limitations caused by Russia’s suspension. In November 2024, the Arctic Council organized a side event at the 29th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, titled A Message from the Frozen World, to discuss the global impact of rapid cryosphere changes. In March 2025, Norway, in cooperation with Nord University, also hosted the Arctic Emergency Management Conference in Bodø. These steps allowed the Council to expand its dialogue beyond traditional Arctic actors and preserve its institutional legitimacy. However, the long-term impact of Norway’s efforts will depend on how effectively the incoming Danish Chairship continues these efforts. While the Council has been able to maintain a working format under Norway, the lack of full participation of all its members continues to narrow its agenda – especially in the face of the challenges the Denmark Kingdom faces.

The Kingdom of Denmark’s Arctic Strategy

The Kingdom of Denmark presented its upcoming Arctic Council Chairship program on 11 April at an event held in Nuuk, Greenland. For the first time, Greenland is taking a leading role in the Chairship. In the new program, Indigenous Communities are placed at the forefront. This is an important step because the program highlights the Arctic as the homeland of Indigenous peoples, and not just as a strategic or ecological region. The program outlines several initiatives to achieve these goals, such as strengthening active participation and consultation with Indigenous Peoples, continuation of the Local2Global Health Initiatives and Norway’s youth engagement efforts, organizing a conference on sustainable development and economic growth, promoting the Blue Bioeconomy and energy transition, implementing the Arctic Biodiversity Action Plan 2025–2035, and hosting events for the Arctic Council’s 30th anniversary in 2026.

Although the Kingdom of Denmark’s Arctic program does not touch on security issues, which shows the desire to preserve the Arctic Council’s role as a neutral institution, the Kingdom’s security priorities had already been announced through a major naval investment program a month earlier. The program focuses on strengthening maritime surveillance and defense, developing autonomous systems, renewing the Home Guard fleet, and preparing for the future replacement of air-defense frigates and the acquisition of Arctic vessels. This investment program runs parallel to the new Arctic Strategy, reflecting Denmark’s practical approach that both supports the region’s development and responds to growing concerns about Arctic security. Through these actions, Denmark demonstrates that a successful Arctic Council policy involves maintaining cooperation in non-political areas and resisting external pressures that could transform the Council into a tool of broader geopolitical competition.

Danish Relations with Russia

While Norway has managed to maintain minimal channels of communication with Russia, this approach may become less realistic for the Kingdom of Denmark. Relations between Denmark and Russia have been in steady decline over the past decades due to strategic rivalry and concerns about Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic. However, recent negotiations between the United States and Russia over joint resource extraction could shift the balance of power, potentially weakening Russian-Chinese cooperation. For Denmark, this may mean a need to reconsider diplomatic approaches to Russia in the face of changing regional dynamics. Besides, Russia’s concerns about China’s growing influence in the Arctic provide Denmark with an opportunity to mediate, re-engage Russia, and align with other Arctic states. If Denmark can capitalize on these differences, it can take a more flexible position and establish limited contacts between Russia and other Arctic states. Such interactions, though unlikely, may be facilitated through the Arctic Council’s working groups.

Danish Relations with the US

In recent months, the Danish Presidency of the Arctic Council has been challenged by the new US position on the Arctic, Greenland and Europe. President Donald Trump’s continued provocative statements regarding the potential transfer of Greenland to US control have heightened political tensions. However, neither the Kingdom of Denmark as a whole nor Greenland itself has supported these assertions. In April 2025, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen made an official visit to Nuuk, where she, together with Greenland’s acting head of government Múte Bourup Egede and newly elected head of government Jens-Frederik Nielsen issued a statement rejecting any external claims. This joint statement demonstrates unity within the Danish Realm in the face of external pressure.

The United States views Greenland as a strategically important territory for its missile defense and Arctic surveillance system, especially in the context of the development of the Pituffik base. This is related to the US strategic pressure on the Kingdom. Denmark’s response has been to strengthen its position in the Arctic while avoiding direct confrontation with the United States, supporting Greenland’s right to self-determination, and strengthening its defense to protect its interests in the region. However, growing pressure from the US is undermining the Kingdom’s diplomatic control over the Arctic agenda and is contributing to the decline of the Arctic Council’s influence as a platform for regional cooperation.

The Dilemmas of a Tripartite Kingdom

In this context, the structure of the Kingdom of Denmark, comprising Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands, takes on particular significance, as the distribution of powers between them determines the Kingdom’s ability to form a coherent Arctic policy and respond to rising geopolitical tensions, which directly impacts its role within the Arctic Council. Each part of the Danish Kingdom has distinct priorities that determine its Arctic approach. Denmark focuses on military security and sovereignty, while Greenland and the Faroe Islands seek greater economic independence and stronger representation in Arctic institutions, particularly the Arctic Council. For example, Greenland is diversifying its economy, opened a representative office in Beijing in 2021, and in 2025 formed a new government favoring gradual independence, positioning Greenland and the Faroe Islands to play a substantive role during Denmark’s Arctic Council chairship.

The Danish Chairship will try to adapt the current structure of the Arctic Council to the new geopolitical environment. This means maintaining cooperation where possible, preventing the Council’s format from disintegrating, and avoiding steps that could reinforce the perception of the Arctic as an area of exclusively Western control. The internal structure of the Kingdom, including the interests of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, will have a significant impact on the country’s ability to pursue such a policy. The growing political importance of Greenland could play a key role in an upcoming Chairship, shaping a new approach to cooperation in the Arctic, which will require flexibility in considering both internal and external factors, including relations with the United States and other actors.